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Abstract
This paper studies the bio-evolutionary origin of time preference.
By examining human life-history strategies, it shows that time prefer-
ence reﬂects the change in the value of survival, which in turn depends
on future reproduction and production. It also demonstrates that our
biologically endowed time preference is fully embodied in mortality, is
always larger than one, reaches its lowest at around age twenty and
increases thereafter. These implications are consistent with empirical
ﬁndings.
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11 Introduction
Intrinsic human characteristics are the end products of natural selection
that have been acquired during the course of evolution. The ﬁrst study to
explicitly formalize this notion in economics is by Hansson and Stuart (1990).
They argued that naturally selected preferences are the preferences that
maximize ﬁtness and that, in equilibrium, the marginal rate of substitution
in utility is equal to the marginal rate of substitution in ﬁtness.
Rogers (1994) applied this idea to explain time preference. He contended
that human time preference is also in evolutionary equilibrium and that the
rate of time preference is given by the marginal rate of substitution (in
ﬁtness) between present and future consumption.
Sozou and Seymour (2003) further examined the relationship between
time discounting and ﬁtness by applying a biological framework called life
history theory. Their model speciﬁcally incorporates the disposable soma
theory (Kirkwood 1977; Kirkwood and Rose 1991). In essence, life history
theory is an analytical framework to study species-speciﬁc life-history strate-
gies, such as the age-trajectory of fertility, the timing of maturity and the
age-trajectory of mortality, presuming that these life-history traits are the
results of adaptation to a unique environment. The disposable soma theory,
in particular, suggests that the optimal strategy is to age, and not to have
an indeﬁnite life, in the natural environment in which extrinsic mortality is
high. Intuitively, this is because the maintenance of the body competes with
immediate reproduction for limited resources. Investing in maintenance to
the level of immortality is simply too expensive compared with immediate
reproduction.
This could be interpreted that senescence is the result of discounting the
future. The future, which is uncertain in nature, is less important than the
present in terms of ﬁtness. As a result, fewer resources are allocated for the
future, or maintenance of the body, and senescence becomes the optimal
life-history strategy. Sozou and Seymour (2003) incorporated this idea and
argued that time discounting can be measured by the rate of aging that is
given by the sum of mortality rate and the rate of decline in fertility.
Along this line, Chu et al (2008) also examined time preference in the
context of life history theory and derives the condition that makes intergen-
erational transfers advantageous. Other studies that referred to the rela-
tionship between life history theory and time preference include Hill (1993)
and Robson and Kaplan (2003).
In a similar manner, Acharya and Balvers (2004) viewed time preference
as the end product of natural selection, but from a diﬀerent perspective.
They assumed that individuals make their life-cycle consumption choices to
maximize life expectancy, presuming that life expectancy would approxi-
mately mirror the expected number of oﬀspring. Based on this assumption,
they showed that time preference reﬂects mortality.
2This paper follows these studies and examines the relationship between
life-history strategies and time preference. Deriving time preference from
life-history strategies, however, does not necessarily reject the relationship
between time preference and non-biological factors. Social factors such as
learning and culture can aﬀect time discounting (Becker and Mulligan 1997).
Similarly, it is not surprising if psychological and age-related factors are
related to time preference (Trostel and Taylor 2001). In fact, these factors
may be regarded as the end-products of life-history strategies. Furthermore,
survival is not the only risk factor. This paper aims to assess the bio-
evolutionary basis of time preference that may be equivalent to the ‘endowed
discount factor’ in the model developed by Becker and Mulligan (1997).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents human
characteristics in the framework of life history theory in order to establish a
common basis to apply life history theory to humans. Section 3 speciﬁes the
model and examines human life-history strategies. The main result is that
the age-speciﬁc mortality rate reﬂects the value of survival, which in turn
depends on future reproductive and productive contributions. Sections 4
and 5 evaluate time preference in the context of life-history strategies. The
results indicate that our biologically endowed time preference reﬂects the
change in the value of survival, is fully embodied in mortality, is always pos-
itive, reaches its lowest at around age twenty and increases thereafter. These
implications are consistent with empirical ﬁndings. Section 6 concludes.
2 Life History Theory and Human Traits
Life history theory provides an analytical framework to study the relation-
ship between species-speciﬁc life-history strategies (characteristics) and ﬁt-
ness (Gadgil and Bossert 1970). When the population reaches the upper
limit of the carrying capacity and remains stationary, the measure of ﬁtness
is given by the expected number of oﬀspring (the net reproduction rate) at





where lx is the survival probability up to age x and bx is the reproduc-
tive contribution at age x, with x ≥ 1 (Taylor et al. 1974).1 As equation
(1) calculates the value of survival in terms of reproduction at birth under
stationary population, F1 is also equivalent with the reproductive value at
birth. With the pressure of natural selection, the genotypes and the associ-
ated phenotypes (strategies) that generate a higher value of F1 have spread
out and remained in the current population.
1See e.g. Stearns (1992) for the methods to measure ﬁtness in various environments.
3More generally, the reproductive value at age j under stationary popu-










where the second equality of equation (2) shows that the reproductive value
is the sum of the current and future contributions to reproduction. The
relationship between these two terms represents the essence of life history
theory, i.e., the trade-oﬀ between reproduction and survival (Williams 1966).
As both current reproductive contribution, bj, and the survival probability
to the next period,
lj+1
lj , depend on the amount of energy allocated, spending
more on one means spending less on the other. In other words, immediate
reproduction and survival are competing for the same resources.
This trade-oﬀ actually represents the trade-oﬀ between current and fu-
ture reproduction. Future reproduction is possible only if the individual
survives to the future, and survival is merely a means for future reproduc-
tion. Thus, if current reproduction is more important relative to future re-
production, more resources would be allocated to current reproduction and
less to survival. The relative importance of current and future reproduction
determines the allocation of resources between immediate reproduction and
survival.
Applying life history theory to a particular species, the surrounding en-
vironment of the species needs to be taken into consideration. In the case
of humans, the surrounding environment is considered to be the African
savannah, in which humans (the genus Homo) existed for most of their two-
million-year history. In this environment, humans lived as hunters and gath-
erers and created their unique society. Most of our intrinsic traits (strategies)
that separate us from chimpanzees, our closest living relatives, presumably
result from our adaptation to this ancestral environment.
Incorporating the surrounding environment, the mechanism connecting
the environment and species-speciﬁc characteristics can be examined in the
framework of life history theory. For example, Robson and Kaplan (2003)
analyzed intelligence in connection with longevity, and showed that these
distinctive traits have evolved together as life-history strategies to adapt in
African savannahs to gather nutrient-dense food.
The signiﬁcance of energy transfer between individuals is another exam-
ple of human characteristics. Obviously, the transfer of energy, or in other
words, parental care, allomothering, and cooperative breeding, is not limited
to humans. The inter-individual transfer of energy is widely observed across
species as kin selection theory (Hamilton 1964) suggests. Intergenerational
transfers, in particular, are recognized as a crucial component of life-history
strategies in various species (Lee 2003).
Nonetheless, energy transfer is still considered to be one of the most
4prominent features of human society. One reason is that the amount of en-
ergy transfer among humans is substantial. For example, comparing human
hunter-gatherers and chimpanzees, hunter-gatherer men produce twice as
much as they consume, whereas chimpanzee males produce just as much,
and the surplus of energy of human males is utilized to support reproduction
(Kaplan et al. 2000). This shows that the magnitude of energy transfer is
one of the prominent features that separates us from chimpanzees.
Another reason that energy transfer among human beings is signiﬁcant
is found in the variety of relationships between the donor and the recipient.
Among humans, the relationship of the donor and the recipient of transfer
is not limited to a speciﬁc relationship. The donor can be a mother, a fa-
ther, an aged parent, a grandparent, a child, a spouse, a sibling, a relative,
or even an unrelated individual. Consequently, the type of the recipient
can also be diverse. On the other hand, in most of the other species, the
relationship of the donor and the recipient is limited to a particular rela-
tionship, such as the mother-oﬀspring relationship in most mammals and
inter-sibling relationship among eusocial insects.2 Thus, the diversity in re-
lationships between the donor and the recipient is also considered to be one
of the distinctive features in humans.
For these reasons, energy transfer is regarded as one of the crucial fac-
tors that aﬀect human evolutionary process in a number of studies.3 For
example, intergenerational transfers as well as learning play critical roles in
promoting the coevolution of intelligence and longevity (Robson and Kaplan
2003). Similarly, the grandmother hypothesis is based on intergenerational
transfers made from grandmothers to their daughters and grandchildren
(Hawkes 2003).
Nevertheless, the deﬁnition of energy transfer is not straightforward. In a
broader sense, pregnancy, for example, can be considered to be an intergen-
erational transfer because the basic necessities for survival are transferred to
the unborn oﬀspring from the mother. Generally speaking, however, preg-
nancy, as well as other energy transfers before birth, is considered to be part
of fertility.
To avoid this kind of overlap, energy transfer in this study is deﬁned
as the diﬀerence between production and consumption as in Kaplan (1994)
and Kaplan et al (2000). This indicates that all transfers are in the form of
material resources. In other words, as long as transfers are materials, they
are not limited to the transfer from parents to oﬀspring, and can be arranged
between any types of individuals. In contrast, transfers of a non-material
basis are included in reproductive contribution, implying that reproductive
contribution covers not only fertility but also the transfer of energy when
2See Carey and Gruenfelder (1997) for the roles of the elderly and intergenerational
transfers in other species.
3The mechanism that promotes the evolution of intergenerational transfers is studied
by Chu and Lee (2006).
5resources are consumed and processed into energy by other individuals. This
includes breast-feeding, protection, warmth, and teaching by both parents
and non-parents.
The next section presents the model and examines life-history strategies
with resource transfers.
3 Optimal Life History
Focusing on life-history events after maturity, let the reproductive contribu-
tion of an individual at age x be
bx = AxV γ
x (3)
where Ax is exogenously-determined reproductive eﬃciency, Vx is the en-
ergy contributed to reproduction, and γ is the parameter with 0 < γ < 1.
Reproductive eﬃciency, Ax, represents the productivity connecting energy
inputs and reproductive outcome through childbirth and childcare. In gen-
eral cases, Ax is expected to be higher (more eﬃcient) when the individual
is young since it deteriorates with senescence. The parameter γ expresses
the degree of concavity of reproductive output, bx. Since the time that can
be allocated for reproduction is not inﬁnite during each period, bx increases
with Vx but at a decreasing rate.
Next, assume that all death at any age occurs at the end of the period
and that the age-speciﬁc mortality rate is given by
mx = e−qWx (4)
where q is a parameter representing exogenously-given maintenance eﬃ-
ciency and Wx is the energy allocated for survival. Subsequently, given that







Equation (5) shows that the chance of surviving to the next age is nil at
Wx = 0 and the chance increases with Wx.
The energy for Vx and Wx is obtained from consumption. At each period,
the individual consumes resources and converts them into energy. Then, the
energy is physiologically allocated to Vx and Wx.
On the production side, let yx be the exogenously-given amount of pro-
duction which can possibly depend on age. Age-dependent factors such as
experience, learning and physical strength may aﬀect the amount of produc-
tion. Assuming that resources cannot be stored and that the members of the
6community share resources, the intratemporal aggregate budget constraint
of the community is given by
∞ ∑
x=1
lx (yx − Vx − Wx) ≥ 0. (6)
Generally speaking, older individuals transfer resources to younger individ-
uals such as their own children, nieces, and nephews (Lee 1997).
Equation (6) is also the individual’s intertemporal budget constraint.
Individuals borrow resources from older generations when they are young
and their reproductive values are relatively high. Instead, they transfer
resources to younger generations later in their lives. It is worth noting that
the amount of resources they return exceeds the amount they borrow. This
is because they need to pay back for those who died, possibly such as their
sisters and brothers. In other words, the community works as the extended
family to share mortality risks, and survivors take care of orphans. In this
situation, the budget constraint does not necessarily hold at each period at
the individual level. Instead, the budget constraint must be met at lifetime
level so that the expected lifetime consumption is no more than the expected
lifetime income.
Given these conditions, the next step is to solve for the optimal allocation
of resources that maximizes the reproductive value, F1. Since the problem
can be expressed as a simple static optimization problem in which all values
are measured at the beginning of the life, the Lagrangian method is applied.
Substituting bx in equation (3) into equation (1) and using equation (6), the
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7To interpret the meaning, these equations are reorganized as follows.
First, equation (8) can be rewritten as
γAjV
γ−1
j = φ. (10)
This indicates that the shadow price is equal to the marginal beneﬁts of
immediate reproductive investment and that the marginal beneﬁts of Vx are
constant across ages.












(yx − Vx − Wx) = φ, (11)
or equivalently,
qe−qWj (Fj+1 + φkj+1) = φ (12)
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lj+1 (yx − Vx − Wx), the accumulated
productive surplus that the individual is expected to obtain at age j +1 on-
wards. Note that Fj+1 can be interpreted as the value of survival to age
j + 1 in terms of reproduction. This is because the advantage of surviving
to age j + 1 in terms of reproduction is solely expressed in Fj+1. Similarly,
kj+1 can be understood as the value of survival to age j + 1 in terms of
production. By surviving to age j + 1, the individual can acquire this pro-
ductive surplus. However, obtaining productive surplus itself is not the end.
Production is valuable because it can be converted to reproductive contri-
bution. The term φ expresses the exchange rate that converts the value of
productive surplus into the value of reproductive contribution. Thus, φkj+1
represents the value of the accumulated productive surplus on reproduction
at age j + 1, and subsequently expresses the value of survival to age j + 1
in terms of indirect reproductive contribution.
Putting them together, the terms in the parentheses in equation (12),
Fj+1 +φkj+1, can be interpreted as the value of survival that includes both
direct (reproductive) and indirect (productive) contributions. By surviving
to age j+1, the individual currently at age j obtains Fj+1+φkj+1. Therefore,
given that qe−qWj is the marginal eﬀect of Wj on survival, equation (12)
shows that the marginal beneﬁt of Wj on reproduction is equal to the cost
of spending one unit of resources on Wj which is represented by φ. It also
indicates that the marginal beneﬁts of Wx are constant across ages.
Finally, equating equations (8) and (9), the relationship between Vj and







8This shows that the marginal eﬀects of reproductive and survival invest-
ments must intratemporally be equal.
Equations (10), (12), together with (13) exhibit the optimal life-history
strategy, i.e., the age-trajectories of reproductive contribution and survival.








Equation (14) shows that mortality rate reﬂects the value of survival, Fj+1+
φkj+1, given that φ and q are constant. In other words, the change in the
value of survival shapes the age-trajectory of mortality.
Now, assume for a moment that Ax and yx are constant without any
biological age limit. In this hypothetical case, age has no meaning but is
merely the number of years after birth. Individuals of all ages are basically
equipped with the same physiological quality. This implies that the relative
importance of the present to the future is constant across ages and that
all individuals allocate the resources in the same manner. Thus, in this
case, Vx and Wx are constant and the transfer of energy is equal to zero
at all ages, indicating that the mortality rate remains constant across ages.
Accordingly, Fx+1 is constant and kx+1 is equal to zero for all ages. Namely,
individuals do not senesce in this hypothetical situation.
However, age matters to determinate growers, including humans, that
stop growing at maturity. Among determinate growers, Ax is expected to
decrease with age after maturity. As a result, Fx+1 often hits its peak at
maturity and decrease thereafter. This is the reason that the upward age-
trajectory of mortality rates after maturity is the norm among determinate
growers. Similarly, the value of kx+1 primarily depends on the age-trajectory
of yx. However, the change in kx+1 is not straightforward for humans since
human productivity increases even after maturity. For example, human
productivity in the natural environment is expected to increase until they
reach middle age (Kaplan et al. 2000).4 This indicates that the change in
mortality rate, whether it decreases or increases, depends on the size of the
change in φkx+1 relative to Fx+1. If the contribution of the increase in kx+1
outweighs the decline in Fx+1, mortality rate may decrease, especially in the
earlier parts of adulthood.
To examine the signiﬁcance of the change in yx as well as other param-
eters, the age-trajectory of mortality rates is calculated with various sets of
parameter values in Figure 1. The results show that, in general, mortality
monotonically increases towards the end of the maximum lifespan. The ex-
ceptional case is when the gain in productivity is signiﬁcant enough to oﬀset
4Intergenerational transfers are all the more important because the changes in pro-
ductivity and reproductive value do not move together. If they move in parallel, energy
transfers may be simply redundant.
9the decline in reproductive contribution. As shown in Figure 1(b), mortality
can decrease in the early part of adulthood when the gain in productivity
is relatively large.
Place Figure 1 around here
This case is considered to be close to the actual age-trajectory of human
mortality in the ancestral environment. For example, the age-speciﬁc mor-
tality of the Ache people, a hunter-gatherer population in Paraguay, hits
its lowest around twenty years of age and continues to rise in the subse-
quent ages (Hill and Hurtado 1996). Interestingly, the mortality rate still
decreases at the age of maturity. Presuming that the age-trajectory of mor-
tality in the ancient environment can be speculated from the ones in recent
hunter-gatherer populations, human mortality in the natural environment
is expected to hit its lowest around twenty years of age.
4 Resource Allocation and Behavior
It has been shown that the importance of present reproduction relative to
future reproduction shapes the age-trajectories of reproductive contribu-
tion and mortality, and simultaneously determines the intratemporal and
intertemporal allocation of resources. Using these results, the properties of
optimal life-history strategies can be examined.
Regarding the intratemporal allocation, crucial properties are summa-
rized in equation (13). The marginal beneﬁts are equal between reproductive
and survival investments. However, we, as human, have virtually no means
of deliberately controlling the allocation of consumed energy between repro-
ductive contribution and survival since our physiology (the neuroendocrine
systems or hormones) regulates the allocation of consumed energy (Finch
and Rose 1995). In this aspect, the intratemporal allocation is not related
to our behavior. Although we can partly inﬂuence the allocation of energy
by determining what to consume and how to behave, e.g., by consuming
more positional goods to increase the chance of mating instead of consum-
ing foods to raise the chance of survival, or by taking risky actions to attract
the members of the opposite sex, the intratemporal allocation of energy de-
pends more on our physiology than on our behavior.
Turning to the intertemporal aspect, the optimal level of consumption,
Cx = Vx + Wx, is expected to decrease with senescence. This is because Vx
is expected to either remain constant or decrease and Wx to decrease with
senescence. Therefore, the optimal age-tragejctory of consumption becomes
decreasing with age unless Wx is increasing rapidly with age.
The intertemporal aspect can be examined further with the marginal
rates of substitution between current and future consumption, MRSx. Let-
10ting j be an arbitrary age that corresponds to the current period, MRSj






∂Cx for x = j,j + 1 are given by the























qe−qWj+1 (Fj+2 + φkj+2), (18)
for those surviving at age j. As Cx can be allocated to either Vx or Wx, the
marginal beneﬁts of reproductive and survival investments on the reproduc-
tive value, which are equivalent at optimal, represent the marginal beneﬁt
of consumption on the reproductive value.
It is worth noting that the change in Wx aﬀects Fj in two ways. One
way is through lx+1. This directly changes the expected reproductive contri-
bution. The other way is through kx+1. The change in Wx indirectly alters
reproductive outcomes by inﬂuencing the expected productive surplus since
additional productive surplus can eventually be converted to consumption
and contribute to reproduction.
Thus, MRSj on the optimal path where marginal beneﬁts of reproduc-







Here, the superscript ∗ is added to stress that this is the optimal value that
maximizes ﬁtness. Equation (19) shows that, on the optimal path, MRSj
is expressed by the inverse of age-speciﬁc survival probability. As it is cal-
culated on the optimal path, consumption is not necessarily constant across
ages on the path. It coincides with MRSj on the constant consumption
path when individuals do not senesce.
However, in practice, the intertemporal allocation is not involuntary. It
is largely inﬂuenced by our behavior since we can deliberately control it by
deciding how much to consume at present. Thus, we may possibly behave
in a non-optimal way without an appropriate mechanism that coordinates
our behavior.
Preferences can serve as the mechanism that coordinates our behavior
as our behavior depends on our preferences. In the course of evolution,
it is considered that preferences that lead to non-optimal behaviors would
have been eliminated and those that generate a higher reproductive value
11in the ancient environment have spread out and remained in the current
population. The behavior that yielded a higher reproductive value resulted
in a higher utility, at least, in the ancient past.
To see this, suppose that individuals are endowed with time-seaprable
lifetime utility function and that each instantaneous utility function reﬂects
the eﬀects of consumption on the reproductive value on the same age. It
is worth noting that the reproductive value depends on both reproductive
contribution and survival investment. Individuals obtain utility from con-
sumption because it increases current reproductive contribution and survival
probability, and consequently contribute to ﬁtness.
This implies that the instantaneous utility function is not necessarily
independent of age. As the eﬀects of consumption on the reproductive value
depends on age, it is more plausible to assume that the instantaneous utility
function changes with age. At the prime of reproductive periods in which
resources can be transformed into the reproductive value more eﬃciently, the
same amount of consumption would yield a higher utility. The assumption of
the constant instantaneous utility function is reasonable only if individuals









where u(Cx;x) is the instantaneous utility function at age x and βx is time
preference between age x and x+1 which measures the relative importance
of u(Cx;x) over u(Cx+1;x + 1).5 Here, the instantaneous utility function
satisﬁes ordinary properties such as continuity, increasing monotonicity and
strict concavity.
Suppose further that the marginal beneﬁts of reproductive and survival
investments are correctly translated into the marginal utilities at the ﬁtness-
maximizing levels of consumption and that the marginal utilities measured
at these levels are constant across ages. This corresponds to the condition
that the marginal beneﬁts of reproductive and survival investments are con-
stant across ages on the optimal path. Thus, when the ﬁtness-maximizing
level of consumption decreases with senescence, the marginal utilities mea-
sured at the constant level of consumption also decline with age.
Next, suppose that individuals can exchange resources with the age-
depnednet interest rate, Rx, which each individual can not control. Here,
the source of interests is mortality risk, and thus, Rx must correspond to
5One straightforward example of the instantaneous utility function is











given that consumption is physiologically allocated to V and W in an optimal manner so
that it satisﬁes equation (13) with optimal Fx+1 and kx+1.








(yx − Cx) ≥ 0. (22)
In the context of intergenerational transfers, it is expected that young indi-
viduals borrow resources and older individuals return them to young indi-
viduals under this budget constraint.
Using these conditions, the optimal allocation of consumption that max-




Rxu′(Cx+1;x + 1) (23)
where the derivatives are taken for consumption. This is the standard Eular
equation expect that instantaneous utilities can possibly be age-dependent.
To achieve the optimum where ﬁtness is maximized, equation (23) must
be satisﬁed with ﬁtness-maximizing level of consumption, C∗
x, for all ages.





. As Rx corresponds
to the actuarially fair premium, it must be equal to the inverse of the con-
ditional survival probability to the next age, lx





when Cx = C∗
x.
Considering that the individual is maximizing his/her own lifetime util-








for all ages. Otherwise, individuals would deviate from the ﬁtness-maximizng
trajectory of consumption. Therefore, the endowed time preference must be
equal to MRSx in equation (19) when the utility function correctly reﬂects
the eﬀects of consumption on ﬁtness.
5 Implications
Equation (24) indicates that time preference is fully manifested by mortality.
This is not a coincident. As both mortality and time preference reﬂect
the value of survival in the same manner, they are equivalent. Mortality
embodies the value of survival at the physiological level and time preference
represents it at the behavioral level. To the contrary, other life-history
6The individual being endowed with an appropriate time preference is a necessary
condition to achieve C
∗
x as the utility-maximizing level of consumption. If βx ̸= β
∗
x for any
x, the age-trajectory of consumption is not consistent with ﬁtness-maximizing trajectory
anymore. It is also suﬃcient in the long run where only the ﬁtness-maximizing optimum
continues to exist.
13factors such as a change in reproductive eﬃciency do not appear in the right-
hand side of equation (24), indicating that they do not directly aﬀect time
preference. They aﬀect time preference only indirectly through inﬂuencing
mortality. This is because the transfer of resources absorbs the changes in
these factors by equalizing the age-speciﬁc marginal beneﬁts of reproductive
investment. Without intergenerational transfers, the change in reproductive
contribution appears in the right-hand side as in Sozou and Seymour (2003).
Equation (24) also suggests that the age-trajectory of time preference
is parallel to that of mortality. Thus, time preference is always larger than
one (the rate of time preference is always positive), indicating that present
consumption is always more important than future consumption. Further-
more, since time preference is considered to be psychologically set in our
minds through the evolutionary process, it is expected that time preference
is parallel to the age-trajectory of mortality in the ancient past when we
existed as hunters and gatherers, not the age-trajectory of mortality in the
current environment. Therefore, our biologically endowed time preference
hits its lowest around the age of twenty and increases thereafter, as the Hill
and Hurtado (1996) mortality data suggest.
These implications are not novel from empirical perspectives. A number
of studies have examined the relationship between age and time preference
(Green et al. 1994; Trostel and Taylor 2001; Ventura 2003; Bishai 2004;
Read and Read 2004), and Trostel and Taylor (2001) and Read and Read
(2004) have found that time preference increases with senescence. The dif-
ference between these two studies lies in the age at which time preference
is at its lowest. The result of Trostel and Taylor (2001) suggests that time
preference continues to increase during adulthood, indicating that it is low-
est among individuals in their twenties. On the other hand, in Read and
Read (2004), the rate of time preference is lowest among individuals in their
forties. The results obtained in this paper are closer to the empirical ﬁnd-
ings in Trostel and Taylor (2001) although time preference in this study
represents only the endowed time preference.
Finally, it is worth discussing that being endowed with an appropriate
time preference is not the only solution among a larger set of human be-
haviors. It is true that an appropriate time preference is necessary if the
individual is maximizing his/her own utility. However, if individuals are
assumed to possess the ability to share consumption intratemporally with
others so that the marginal utilities are equal among all the members of
the community, it would also generate the ﬁtness-maximizing allocation of
consumption. Instead of maximizing their own lifetime utilities, individ-
uals simply share resources in the community so that u′(Cx;x) is equal to
u′(Cx+1;x+1) under equation (22) which is now regarded as the intratempo-
ral aggregate budget constraint with
∏x−1
i=0 Ri = lx. Indeed, anthropological
studies have shown that the hunter-gatherer populations share food accord-
ing to their needs (see e.g. Kaplan and Gurven 2005).
14When the population is stationary, this allocation strategy is equivalent
with the utility-maximizing allocation. Allocating consumption intratempo-
rally so that the marginal utilities are equal across individuals within the
same period is equivalent to allocating consumption intertemporally so that
the marginal utilities are constant across ages for the individual. Therefore,
if individuals possess the ability to share consumption properly with others,
it can also guarantee that consumption is allocated in a ﬁtness-maximizing
manner.7 Consequently, individuals do not need to take the intertemporal
allocation of consumption into consideration, rendering the intertemporal
perspective redundant.
In this case, empathy, or more precisely, a set of moral codes built out
of empathy (Baron-Cohen 2005), would probably be what drives us to share
consumption. Empathy creates aﬀective feelings toward others by allowing
the individual to infer, understand, and/or share another’s emotional state.
In particular, humans, and perhaps apes among primates, are known to have
acute cognitive abilities to empathize. These species have the ability to take
another’s perspective and respond with appropriate emotion without loosing
self-identity (see e.g. Decety and Jackson 2004; de Waal 2008 for reviews).
This ability, called empathic perspective-taking, helps one to understand
the other’s speciﬁc situation and needs, and allows that individual to take
other-regarding pro-social behaviors such as food sharing.
Comparing these two mechanisms that enable consumption to be allo-
cated in a ﬁtness-maximizing manner, it is more advantageous to be endowed
with time preference if there exist any reasons that require intertemporal
consideration. For example, when there is a seasonal or daily variation in
the amount of food that individuals can possibly hunt or gather, empathy
alone can not adequately cope with this situation. Since smoothening of
the actual production level can contribute to one’s own reproduction, it is
beneﬁcial to have time preference.
Nevertheless, the relationship between time preference and empathy may
not be so simple. As discussed in psychological literature, they might be
related at their origins (Posner 1995; Frederick 2003; Pronin et al. 2008).
According to these studies, the present self and the future selves are virtually
separate persons, and time preference is the reﬂection of the importance of
the present self relative to the future selves. In particular, the experiments
in Pronin et al (2008) showed that the decisions people make for the future
selves and other people are similar. In this context, time preference can be
interpreted as one form of empathy, empathy to the future selves. The value
of the present self relative to the future selves with appropriate discounting
factors yields the optimal rate of time preference. In this regard, empathy
7The possibility that other equilibria that satisfy u
′(Cx,x) = u
′(Cx+1,x+1) with non-
ﬁtness-maximizing level of consumption accidently exist can not be excluded in the short
run. However, these equilibria would be eliminated in the long run where the force of
natural selection is strong.
15is considered to be the root of time preference (see Frederick 2003 for more
details).
6 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper is to understand the mechanism regulating our
intertemporal choices. To do this, it examines human life-history strategies
and demonstrates that time preference reﬂects the change in the value of
survival.
The results support the idea that mortality and time preference are two
sides of the same coin. The coin is the value of survival. Mortality embodies
it at the physiological level and time preference represents it at the behav-
ioral level. Since the study of Yaari (1965), mortality has been considered to
be one of the components that cause discounting. However, mortality is not
merely one of the components, but is the reﬂection of time preference. It
is true that “the future is discounted because survival is uncertain” (Yaari
1965). Yet, the opposite is also true that “survival is more uncertain because
the future is discounted.”
Consequently, the traditional view that time preference is something un-
favorable needs to be revised. Time preference is often seen as a weakness
or cognitive deﬁciency, and is often ascribed to impatience, shortsighted-
ness, myopia or irrationality. Therefore, studies that aim to explain time
preference tend to look for the causes of irrationality and ask why we are
not perfect. However, as discussed in this paper, time preference is not a
deﬁciency, but is an optimal trait that was acquired during the course of
evolution. Our surrounding environment has changed since then and the
rate of time preference embedded in us may not exactly be optimal any
more. However, being too patient is not optimal either.
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